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COMMENT
ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS AND REPORTING IN
HIGHWAY SYSTEM PLANNING
The Department of Transportation (DOT) files more environ-
mental impact statements under section 102 (2) (C) of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)1 than all other agencies of the
federal government combined.2 Nearly as many impact statements
are filed on roads as on all other types of federal projects.' Despite
the good faith effort these statistics suggest, the number of court ac-
tions brought to enjoin federally funded highway construction projects
across the country indicates that there is a substantial clash between
perceived environmental values and transportation needs.4
Most of these suits are critical, last-minute actions, brought to
enjoin imminent construction. The highway planning inadequacies
that they disclose, however, may have occurred at an earlier, environ-
mentally more crucial, stage of project development. The Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) presently requires the first environ-
mental impact statement for a project only at the route location stage. 5
By that time many of the most significant decisions affecting the envi-
ronment have been made.0 Consideration of alternative modes of
transportation is no longer feasible.7 At that stage only the one project
-which may be part of a planned regional highway system, other
parts of which may have already been built and still other parts of
which may be far in the future-can be considered. In order to achieve
a proper balance between environmental needs and highway develop-
ment, planners must consider projects on both regional and local levels.
Environmental analysis and reporting for federally funded highway
building must occur at various points in a project's development, begin-
ning at an early stage. This Comment will consider the failings of the
present procedures, discuss alternative reporting schemes, and indicate
how existing federal statutes may be employed to require environmental
analysis and reporting at the system planning stage.
142 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
2 ComO N ENVIRONm=NTAL QUALITY, TmIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON Tm ENVIRON-
MENT 248, fig. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Tnan ANNuAL REPORT].
3 Id. 249, fig. 2.
4See Thompson v. Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972).
5 FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, 1 6b (Aug. 24, 1971), reprinted in
2 ENV. L. REP. 46106, 46108 (1972).
6 See note 24 infra & accompanying text.
7 See note 25 infra & accompanying text.
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I. THE WEAKNESSES OF PRESENT PROCEDURES
Several discrete steps make up the process by which highway con-
struction projects are programmed for federal money and subsequently
guided through various stages of approval by federal officials.' First,
as a prerequisite to program approval, the highway must be included
in one of several federal-aid highway systems." Then a project must
be programmed for the utilization of federal funds available for a given
year." Next, the FHWA must approve the project's route location"
and design.' 2 Plans, specifications, and estimates approval must follow.'
Finally, the FHWA must give construction approval, called "authoriza-
tion to proceed." 4
For federal aid highways the preparation of environmental impact
statements under section 102 (2) (C) is currently required at the loca-
tion stage.' 5 A draft of this impact statement is circulated among re-
viewing agencies and made public prior to the location public hearing'
Separate hearings are also provided for in the design phase, 7 and under
8 See, e.g., Arlington Coalition on Transp. v. Volpe, 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972);
Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1971).
Peterson & Kennan, The Federal-Aid Highway Program: Administrative Procedures
and Judicial Interpretation, 2 ENv. L. REP. 50001 (1972), stands as the most thorough
elucidation of this process and reveals the conflicts it breeds between the state's quest for
funds and the need for adequate consideration of long-term social and environmental
values. See also Macbeth & Sly, Federal-Aid Highways: Public Participation in the Ad-
ministrative Stages, 1 NATURAL REsouRcEs DEPENSE Couxcrr, INc. NEWsLETTER, Fall
1971, at xvii.
9 23 U.S.C. § 103 (1970).
10Id. § 105.
The exact relationship between program approVal and location and design approval
may vary. A highway improvement may be programmed in any one of a number of
phases from preliminary engineering to paving. Bureau of Public Roads, Policy and Pro-
cedure Memorandum 21-1, f[ 13 (Apr. 15, 1958), reprinted in 2 ENV. L. REP. 46507,
46511 (1972). Whether location, design approval, or both appropriately precede or follow
program approval would logically seem to depend on the phase in which a highway
project is first submitted as part of a state's development program. Nevertheless, to the
extent that states generally seek maximum participation of federal aid funds for each
undertaking, it can be expected that most construction-oriented projects will be pro-
grammed in their early phases and that in most cases program approval will precede
location and design approval.
11 FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 20-8, f lOd(1), 23 C.F.R. ch. I, pt. 1,
app. A, at 15 (1972). Such approval can be given only after a corridor public hearing
has been held or the opportunity for such a hearing afforded. Id. II I 6a, 10d(1) (b), 23
C.F.R. at 13, 15. See also 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1970).
12 FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 20-8, ff 10d(2), 23 C.F.R. ch. I, pt.
1, app. A, at 16. A design public hearing must precede this approval. Id. gf1 6a, lOd(2) (c),
23 C.F.R. at 13, 16. Under limited circumstances the location and design hearings may be
combined. Id. 1 6b, 23 C.F.R. at 13.
1323 U.S.C. § 106(a) (1970).
.4 23 C.F.R. § 1.12 (1972). Authorization to proceed at the construction phase is
analogous to, but not to be confused with, authorization to proceed with federally-
subsidized planning under § 134 of the Federal-Aid Highway Acts, discussed at text
accompanying notes 50-66 infra.
15 FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, ff 6b (Aug. 24, 1971), reprinted
in 2 ENV. L. REP. 46106, 46108 (1972).
1 Id. [ 6c.
17 See note 12 supra.
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some circumstances a supplemental environmental impact statement
must be prepared during design studies.18
Requiring only one full environmental inventory before "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment"' 9 are taken ignores the length and complexity of the planning
process preceding most such actions. Because of the diverse elements
and extended time involved in planning, no one impact statement,
whenever it might be made, can satisfactorily meet the policy goals of
NEPA. The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT)
calculates that planning prior to construction of a section of highway,
for example, covers several distinct phases and takes twelve years.20
Successive planning phases decrease in scope and increase in detail.
For example, planning proceeds from a comprehensive transportation
system analysis to consideration of a single section of highway, and
from the study of alternative locations for a particular section to the
consideration of design features such as culvert size and shape, place-
ment of pedestrian crosswalks, and lighting.2
Even from this rough sketch, it should be clear that an environ-
mental study undertaken at the system planning phase2 2 cannot con-
sider the impacts of alternative design features which have not yet
been conceived. By the same token, a study at the location or design
phase is too late to deal appropriately with some of the broader impacts
of, and alternatives to,23 a highway project or segment which is part
18 FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, f1 6p(1) (Aug. 24, 1971),
reprinted in 2 ENv. L. REP. 46106, 46108 (1972).
The proposed Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, S. 502, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973),
could lead to the gradual disappearance of the complicated sequence outlined in the text.
Section 134 of that bill would add §§ 171-76 to title 23. The new 23 U.S.C. § 172(b)
would provide that
[alny State may submit to the Secretary for his approval and certification a
comprehensive procedure for the construction of Federal-aid highway projects,
setting forth the process by which such State proposes to carry out its Federal-
aid highway construction responsibilities.
The proposed 23 U.S.C. § 172(f) would provide that approval by the Secretary "shall
discharge his responsibility under title 23 with respect to individual project approvals
as required in chapter 1 of this title . . . ." Under the new § 174(c), approval by the
Secretary also would form "a contractual obligation of the Federal Government for the
payment of its proportional contribution to all projects covered by the agreement,"
although the Secretary would continue to oversee projects and could withdraw his
approval upon finding that the state has failed to observe the provisions of the agree-
ment.
1942 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
2 0 Pennsylvania Dep't of Transportation, A New Highway is Born (undated).
21 The court in City of Boston v. Volpe likened phased highway planning to "an
architect's plans, beginning with a broad conceptual rendering of a house in its setting
and ending with detailed drawings of plumbing, outlets, and joists." 464 F.2d 254, 259 (1st
Cir. 1972).
22"System planning" and "planning at the system level" are used throughout this
Comment as synonymous with "comprehensive planning" and may be rudimentarily defined
as "[regional analysis of transportation needs and the identification of transportation
corridors." FHWVA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90, II 3(e) (1), 37 Fed. Reg. 8398,
8399 (1972). Both terms are meant to encompass the determination of appropriate trans-
portation modes within corridors.
23 Section 102(2) (D)\ of NEPA requires all federal agencies to, "study, develop,
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of an integrated system. FHWA has recently acknowledged that many
of the significant environmental effects of projects are determined at
the system planning stage24 and that certain alternatives, mass transit
in particular, are most effectively explored at that earlier stage.2 5
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) 2 has also recog-
nized the weakness of much present environmental reporting. In a
recent memorandum the CEQ encouraged federal agencies responsible
for impact reporting to focus on more broadly defined projects. Recom-
mendation No. 9 of that memorandum stated:
In preparing statements, agencies should give careful atten-
tion to formulating an appropriate definition of the scope of
the project that is the subject of the statement. In many cases,
broad program statements will be appropriate, assessing the
environmental effects of a number of individual actions on a
given geographical area, or the overall impact of a large-scale
program or chain of contemplated projects.... Preparation of
program statements in these cases should be in addition to
preparation of subsequent statements on major individual
actions wherever such actions have significant environmental
impacts that were not fully evaluated in the program state-
ment.27
Elsewhere the CEQ has explained that by affording an occasion for a
more comprehensive consideration of effects and alternatives than is
practicable in a statement on an individual action, a program impact
statement can, under appropriate circumstances, serve what it perceives
as the fundamental purpose of section 102 (2) (C): "preventing un-
anticipated environmental effects from Government actions. 28
Thus, there is a need to begin considering environmental factors
on a program level. It must be reemphasized, however, that environ-
mental inventory at this stage cannot reveal all important impacts and
and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal
which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources .... "
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(D) (1970).
24Many significant economic, social, and environmental effects of a proposed
project are difficult to anticipate at the system planning stage and become clear
only during location and design studies. Conversely many significant environ-
mental effects of a proposed project are set at the system's planning stage.
Decisions at the system and project stages shall be made with consideration of
their social, economic, environmental, and transportation effects to the extent
possible at each stage.
FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-4, ff 14a, 37 Fed. Reg. 21430, 21432
(1972) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. ch. I, pt. 1, app. A).
25 34 Fed. Reg. 727 (1972) (discussion introducing adopted version of FHWA Policy
and Procedure Memorandum 20-8).
26CEQ was established by § 202 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970). Its duties and
functions are defined by § 204 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4344 (1970).27 Council on Environmental Quality Memorandum to Federal Agencies on Pro-
cedures for Improving Environmental Impact Statements f1 BS, reprinted in 3 (Current
Developments] BNA ENv. RFP. 82, 87 (1972).
2 8 Tirm AINmluAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 231.
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alternatives that may come to light after more detailed planning on a
particular construction project. The need for environmental reporting
at the project level remains.
II. UNPROMISING ALTERNATIVES
Given the need for a more comprehensive environmental assess-
ment, two questions remain. First, at what point in the development
of programs can overall environmental impact reporting most effec-
tively further the fundamental purposes of section 102 (2) (C)? More
significantly, what actions which come sufficiently early to serve this
function are within section 102 (2) (C) and thus require impact state-
ments?
Two readily apparent possible occasions for broad-scope environ-
mental reporting do not pass muster. The first such occasion is the
submission of the state's annual highway construction program. It is
unlikely that such programs, which are simply fiscal planning devices,
could provide a satisfactory overview of related projects. The projects
in any one year's program may bear a far less meaningful relation to
each other than to projects in the programs of other years. This is
caused by the structure of the grant-in-aid program under the Federal-
Aid Highway Act which requires states to divide each long-range plan
into annual segments for funding purposes2 9
Equally unpromising as the occasion for a comprehensive section
102 statement is the state's submission of highway proposals for inclu-
sion in one of several federal-aid systems. Each state engages in exten-
sive fragmentation of projects at this point also, as it seeks places for
priority items within the limits imposed by statute for additions to
each of the federal-aid systems.80
Another alternative is to require system impact statements at the
project location stage, requiring that the statement on each project, or
at least on the first project within the system to reach location stage,
address itself to the environmental ramifications of the system of which
it is a part. Such a requirement might be inferred from NEPA in either
of two ways: that the consideration of the impact of any single project
29 See Peterson & Kennan, supra note 8, at 5004-05.
30 See 23 U.S.C. § 103 (1970) ; 23 C.F.R. § 1.6 (1972). A good example of fragmenta-
tion under the current federal-aid systems structure appears in the facts of Thompson v.
Fugate, 347 F. Supp. 120 (El). Va. 1972). There, two-thirds of the Richmond beltway
was made part of the federal interstate system. Lack of any remaining mileage on
Virginia's interstate allocation prevented the inclusion of the rest of the beltway when it
was proposed in 1968. Two years later, still short of interstate miles but anxious to com-
plete the Richmond circumferential, the state resubmitted the last third of the beltway as
part of the federal-aid primary system under the label of Route 288. As a result of these
manipulations, what was essentially a single entity from the standpoint of planning
wound up on the federal-aid network at two different times, as part of two different
systems, and bearing two different route numbers. Cf. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 5 BNA
Euv. REP. CAs. 1033, 1048 (S.D. Tex., Feb. 16, 1973) (numerous separately funded proj-
ects part of one program).
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is inadequate absent discussion that places it within its system context;
or that the "action" referred to in NEPA was meant to encompass pro-
jected systems as well as the individual projects of which they are
composed.3 The first argument is being made in at least two pending
cases.2 The second argument finds some support in cases such as
Thompson v. Fugate,33 in which the court held that an impact statement
was required under NEPA on an 8.3 mile segment of Route 288,
which in turn was part of the 90 mile Richmond Beltway for which
federal funds had not yet been requested by the state. In so holding
the court stated that "[tihe beltway system must be viewed as a
whole, and at the very least, Route 288 must be so viewed."34 If the
system must be viewed as a unit for the purpose of determining whether
an impact statement should be prepared, logically it might also be
considered a single action in determining the scope of the required
statement or statements.3 5
This approach may be simply inadequate to achieve a sufficiently
disinterested review of system plans in the highway context. An impact
statement of any sort would not come, under present procedures, until
just prior to location approval of the first highway project within the
system. By then, however, if the state has sought some phase of pro-
gram approval from the federal government,36 it will already have as-
signed a portion of its federal-aid systems allotment to accommodate the
project (as well as other connected projects),37 and it will have placed
itself under "a definite initial commitment ... to undertake and com-
plete [the work of the phase programmed] within a reasonable length
31 This argument goes much farther than FHWA's expanded definition of a "highway
section." FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-1, ff1 3a, 6, reprinted in 2 ENV.
L. RFP. 46106 '(1972) ; see Peterson & Kennan, supra note 8, at 50017 & n.86.
32 Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972), appeai
docketed, No. 72-1620, 8th Cir., Sept. 29, 1972; Movement Against Destruction v. Volpe,
Civil No. 72-1041M (D. Md., filed Oct. 10, 1972). This argument finds at least some
support in those cases which have prohibited excessive segmenting of what is basically
one highway as a means of limiting the scope of impact statements. See, e.g., Named
Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't,
446 F.2d 1013, 1023 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972); Committee To
Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 740 (D. Conn. 1972).
33 347 F. Supp. 120 (ED. Va. 1972). See note 30 supra.
34 347 F. Supp. at 124. See Sierra Club v. Volpe, 4 BNA ENv. REP. CAs. 1804 (N.D.
Cal., Dec. 6, 1972); Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v.
Texas Highway Dep't, 446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
But see Civic Improvement Comm. v. Volpe, 4 BNA Euv. REP. CAs. 1160 (W.D.N.C.),
af'd, 459 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1972).
35 These arguments for system statements at the first project stage receive support
from the recent decision in Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 5 BNA ENV. REP. CAs. 1033 (S.D.
Tex., Feb. 16, 1973). That case held that if the dam involved was not primarily local in
purpose, it must be considered as just one part of the river basin's comprehensive develop-
ment program, and construction could not proceed without an impact statement on the
broader project. Id. at 1054-55, 1060. Cf. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 835 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
836 See note 10 supra.
3723 U.S.C. § 105 (1970).
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of time."38 If the funds for the programmed projects are not used for
those projects they will be lost.39
Furthermore, local coordinating committees, decisionmaking bodies
within the institutional forms which have grown to surround the "con-
tinuous planning process" of section 134(a), 40 will have adopted at
least that portion of a comprehensive plan on which the project is
"based." Thus there will not be any truly independent determination
of a regional comprehensive plan. In short, location approval of a
particular project is not the proper occasion for a system impact state-
ment because in most instances it will have been preceded by definite
commitments, of funds and attitudes, on the part of state and local
officials to implement the plan of which the project is a part.
Additionally, a combined impact statement on a project and the
system of which it is a part could focus attention on one at the expense
of the other.41 Careful and independent environmental analysis is
needed for both the system and the individual projects. Nevertheless,
requiring system impact statements at this stage could be valuable if
administrators realize that it would be to their advantage (if only to
avoid multiple assessments of system impacts as each project statement
is prepared) to consider the combined environmental effects of the
various projects within the comprehensive plan at the earlier, planning
stage.
III. COMPREHENSIVE TRANSPORTATION PLANNING
It is not surprising that, unlike the impact statement requirement
of NEPA, the pre-program comprehensive transportation planning re-
quired for urban centers by section 134 (a) of title 23 has received little
public attention. Under section 134 (a) the Secretary of Transportation
is directed not to issue program approval for projects
in any urban area of more than fifty thousand population un-
less he finds that such projects are based on a continuing
comprehensive transportation planning process carried on
cooperatively by States and local communities in conformance
with the objectives stated in this section.
4 2
38 Bureau of Public Roads, Policy and Procedure Memorandum 21-1, ff 2 (Apr. 15,
1958), reprinted in 2 ENv. L. RPE. 46507, 46508 (1972).
39 See Peterson & Kennan, supra note 8, at 50005. At an earlier stage the funds could
be transferred to another system being programmed. See id. 50004.
40 See note 49 infra & accompanying text.
41 See Brief for Appellees at 15, Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, No. 72-1620 (8th
Cir., filed Sept. 29, 1972).
4223 U.S.C. § 134(a) (1970).
Procedures that have developed around § 134(a) will form the basis of much of the
discussion that follows in the text. An effort has been made to derive these procedures
directly from relevant FHWA Policy and Procedure Memoranda (PPM's) and Instruc-
tional Memoranda (IM's). (For FHWA's explanation of the status of these memoranda,
see 23 C.F.R. § 1.32 (1972).) In areas where PPM's and IM's seemed inconclusive or
otherwise inadequate to resolve issues that arose, the existing administrative practices of
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It is at this comprehensive planning stage, before plans are broken up
for inclusion in the federal-aid network and programmed for funding,
and before interrelated planning on individual included projects rigidi-
fies commitment to the plan, that there is the greatest potential for
"more comprehensive consideration of effects and alternatives."48 Al-
though it is clear that the comprehensive planning stage is too early
for impact statements concerning design features of future construction,
it is equally clear that broad consideration of transportation modes and
route location can be most useful at the time of the promulgation and
later modification of urban transportation plans and system studies.
These plans and studies are significant in that they typically contain
planners' recommendations which are used to guide policy makers and
programmers in their decisions.44
Two separate provisions in federal statutes, and their administra-
tive interpretations, could require that environmental effects be con-
sidered at the comprehensive transportation planning phase. The cen-
tral provisions are the impact statement requirement of section 102
(2) (C) of NEPA, and the recent Policy and Procedure Memorandum
90-4 promulgated by the FHWA in response to the Federal-Aid
Highway Act of 1970.
A. Impact Statements
It is one thing to say that impact statements covering comprehen-
sive transportation plans would further the fundamental purposes of
section 102 (2) (C). It is quite another to say that the preparation
and adoption of such plans come within the meaning of that section,
as federal courts have interpreted it,45 and require impact statements.
It is now well established that for an environmental impact statement to
be required three conditions must be met: the project must constitute
a "federal action," be of "major" proportions, and significantly affect the
quality of the human environment.46 Furthermore, the requirement of
the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation and FHWA Division Headquarters in
Pennsylvania were used as references. These practices were ascertained in interviews
with L.E. Keefer, Director, Bureau of Advance Planning, and J.B. Chiles, Director, Bureau
of Programming, Pennsylvania Dep't of Transportation, in Harrisburg, Aug. 17, 1972,
and R. Borg, Planning and Research Engineer, FHWA Division Headquarters, in Harris-
burg, Sept. 8, 1972.
43THmD ANNUAL R P ORT, supra note 2, at 233. See Letter from Russell Train, Chair-
man, Council on Environmental Quality, to John Volpe, Secretary of Transportation,
Aug. 18, 1972.
44 Hearings on Urban Highway Planning, Location, and Design Before the Subcomm.
on Roads of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 539
(1967); interview with L.E. Keefer, Director, Bureau of Advance Planning, Pennsylvania
Dep't of Transportation, in Harrisburg, Aug 17, 1972.
45 As has been pointed out, "[tihe legislative history contains little discussion of the
meaning of this phrase ['major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment?]." THD ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 231. This regrettable
absence makes the development of interpretative case law indispensable in the effort to
produce authoritative readings of § 102(2) (C) for the wide range of ongoing administra-
tive activities to which it may apply.
4642 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1970).
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impact statements, like other requirements of section 102, is applicable
only "to the fullest extent possible.1 47 In discussing decisions dealing
with these conditions it must be remembered that analogies must be
relied upon, because no court has considered whether comprehensive
planning under section 134 meets these requirements of NEPA's section
102.
1. Federal Actions
Under section 134, comprehensive planning is not done by FHWA,
but by the state highway agency or a metropolitan or regional agency
selected by the state.48 Plans and priorities are officially adopted and
modified by committees composed of state highway officials and elected
officials from affected political subdivisions, operating under the terms
of written agreements between the state and the locality, to which the
federal government is not a party.49 These arrangements require some
justification for the assertion that section 134 planning can be con-
sidered "federal" within the meaning of NEPA's section 102 (2) (C).
There is substantial support in recent judicial and administrative
decisions for the conclusion that section 134(a) planning is federal for
purposes of NEPA. Underlying this conclusion is the premise that
federal contact with an action at its inception can sufficiently permeate
what follows to imbue those acts with the necessary "federalness." Be-
fore developing this principle, it is necessary to outline the ways in which
FHWA is involved in state highway planning decisions.
Section 307(c)(2) of title 2310 sets aside 1 2 percent of each
state's yearly allocation of federal-aid highway funds for highway
planning and research.51 These funds, abbreviated "HPR funds," 2
may not be used for purposes other than planning and research.5
Another 2 percent of the state's yearly allocation, commonly desig-
nated "PR funds," 4 is available for planning and research if the state
desires to use the money for that purpose rather than for preliminary
engineering studies or construction. 5 FHWA has sanctioned the use of
HPR funds "for systematic and long-range planning and program-
4""d. § 4332.
4 8 DEPAaRT2= or HousinG AD URBAN DEVELOPMENT & DEPARTMENT OF TRUNS-
PORTATION, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON URBAN TRANSPORTATION POLICIES, H.R. Doc. No.
92-331, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972).
49 23 U.S.C. § 134(a) (1970); FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 50-9,
ff 4d (June 21, 1967); see Hearings on Urban Highway Planning, Location, and Design
Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 1st
& 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 538 (1968).
5023 U.S.C. § 307(c)(2) (1970).
51 Under most circumstances the state is required to match federal highway planning
and research grants. Id. § 307(c) (4).
52 FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 50-1.1, f[ 3b(1) (Apr. 18, 1972).
5323 U.S.C. § 307(c)(2) (1970).
54 FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 50-1.1, f1 3b(2) (Apr. 18, 1972).
55 23 U.S.C. § 307(c)(3) (1970).
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ming"56 and encourages their use in particular "for the development
of comprehensive transportation plans in urban areas.1
57
Under existing procedures, planning and research activities for
which a state intends to seek reimbursement from section 307 funds
are enumerated in an annual HPR-PR work program submitted by
the state for FHWA approval.58 For administrative convenience the
annual HPR-PR work program is treated as if it were "one project,"59
although it covers a number of discrete planning items. 0
Approval of the HPR-PR work program by FHWA does not
represent a final commitment of section 307 funds for planning. Only
FHWA "authorization to proceed" with the program or a particular
portion of it establishes "the obligation of Federal funds." 61 In the
majority of urban planning projects, for which the work is to be done
by a metropolitan or regional planning body rather than by the state
highway agency itself, "authorization to proceed" is contingent on
FHWA approval of the proposed contract or working agreement be-
tween the planning body and the state highway agencyY
2
Additional federal funds are available to state and metropolitan
agencies under section 461 of title 40,63 which specifically states that
"[p]lanning which may be assisted under this section includes the
preparation of comprehensive transportation surveys, studies, and
plans .... 7)61
In addition to its funding role, FHWA performs a formal super-
visory function with regard to section 134 planning activities. FHWA
administrative memoranda spell out the minimal content of an accept-
able section 134 planning process65 and establish a pre-program "annual
56FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 21-3, ff 7a (Nov. 20, 1968), reprinted
in 2 ENv. L. REP. 46515, 46516 (1972).
57 1d. fI 7a(2), 2 ENv. L. RP. 46516. In addition to these sources, § 114 of the pro-
posed Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, S. 502, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), would
amend 23 U.S.C. § 104 so as to authorize the Secretary of Transportation to apportion
among the states up to 2 per centum of annual Federal-aid system funds, "for the pur-
pose of carrying out the requirements of section 134 of this title.'
5 8 See, e.g., PENxs-LvANiA DEP'T or TRANSPORTATION, WoaK PROGRAX H.P.R.-P.R.-
1(9) (1972).
59 FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 50-1.1, ff 8c (Apr. 18, 1972).
60 Among the items receiving detailed treatment in PennDOT's HPR-PR work pro-
gram for fiscal year 1973 are comprehensive transportation activities not only in the
state's 11 urban centers with populations over 50,000 but also in 6 centers with less
than 50,000 people. See PErNsyzrvNnA DEP'T or TRANSPORTATION, supra note 58, at
35-47. PennDOT's HPR-PR document also outlines work on a statewide intermodal
transportation plan. See id. 34.
6 1 FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 50-1.1, ff Sa (Apr. 18, 1972).
6 2 See id. f[ 8b; FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 50-1.2, ff 3 (May 18,
1972). PPM 50-1.2 goes on to spell out in great detail the provisions which must appear
in such contracts or work agreements.
6340 U.S.C. § 461 (1970).
6 4 1d. § 461(a). Moneys allocated under this section are identified as § 701 funds,
although the original § 701, Housing Act of 1954, ch. 649, § 701, 68 Stat. 590, did not
specify that "comprehensive transportation surveys" were among the planning activities
that it was intended to cover.
05 FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 50-9 (June 21, 1967).
1973] IMPACT STATEMENTS ON HIGHWAY PLANNING 885
certification procedure" under which planning activities in each of a
state's urban areas must be warranted to comply with FHWA standards
as a condition for program approval of projects in those areas.66 Certifi-
cation does not in itself authorize "federal participation" either in the
planning process or in the construction projects generated under a com-
pleted plan. It is merely a prerequisite for the allocation of construction
funds to projects in the area, and no court has yet held that construc-
tion projects become federal for purposes of NEPA at any time before
location approval. Nevertheless, the voluntary submission by states to
federal planning standards and certification procedures indicates their
intention to seek construction funds for the implementation of section
134 plans; it also enhances federal influence over the tenor of state
planning efforts.
The recently decided case of Davis v. Morto 6 7 serves as a starting
point for the argument that comprehensive transportation planning is
federal action for the purpose of applying NEPA's section 102 (2) (C)
impact statement requirement. In that case Pueblo Indians concluded
a lease with a private land development company. The lease covered a
1300-acre tract with options on four other tracts of Indian land. A
federal statute required the Secretary of the Interior to approve the
lease before it could become effective,68 and he did so through his prop-
erly appointed delegate. When the lease approval was challenged, the
court of appeals upheld the plaintiffs' position that the approval of the
lease was a "major federal action" subject to the requirements of
section 102 (2) (C).
Clearly the approval itself was "federal action," just as the incre-
mental funding of state planning activities is "federal action." In
Davis, however, the government sought to draw a line between the
approval of the lease, on the one hand, and the lease itself and subse-
quent development, on the other, just as one might be tempted to
confine the characterization "federal" to periodic inputs of planning
money and not extend it to the adoption of finished plans by local
officials. The court capsulized the government's argument in Davis
this way:
The United States did not initiate the lease, was not a party,
possessed no interest in either the lease or the development,
did not participate financially or benefit from the lease in any
way. Before federal action will constitute major federal action
under the mandates of NEPA, the government must initiate,
participate in or benefit from the project.6 9
It was the court's view that the scope of federal participation
66 FHWA Instructional Memorandum 50-3-71 (Apr. 13, 1971).
67469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972).
6825 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1970).
69 469 F.2d at 595.
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represented by the government's approval of the lease could not be
confined to the mere approval of a piece of paper. Certain conditions
in the lease (e.g., requirement of governmental approval of subsequent
encumbrances on the leased lands; waiver of governmental liability
for injuries on the leased lands) suggested to the court a governmental
interest sufficient to make the lease and all that was contemplated by it
federal. This broader view meant that the lease approval constituted
"major federal action,"70 requiring an impact statement covering not
only the effects of the lease, but also the effects of the projects which
were to flow from that lease.
71 There are, as has been discussed,
72
numerous conditions in planning program agreements that indicate
the federal government's active interest in the tenor and quality of the
comprehensive planning efforts of state and regional planners. Under a
Davis-type analysis, therefore, such interest could so pervade the entire
"continuous planning process" as to render it, and the plans it produces,
federal for purposes of section 102 (2) (C).
Before developing this approach in the highway planning context,
two differences should be noted. While the initial federal contact in
Davis was the approval of a lease, the initial federal contact in highway
planning is in the form of specific grants for such planning. And while
an impact statement on what will result from the approval of the lease
in Davis should be prepared at the time of that approval, the appropri-
ate time for considering the environmental impact of what results from
the planning funds is at the completion of the plans.
73
There is more specific support for the conclusion that the injection
of federal funds into the planning process makes the resulting plans
federal for section 102 (2) (C) purposes. Among actions that may
trigger the section 102 (2) (C) requirement, CEQ has included "[p] roj-
ects and activities... supported in whole or in part through Federal
contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of funding assis-
tance. ' 74 This formulation implies that programs ("continuing activi-
70Id. at 596. But cf. Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971),
vacated and remanded for a determination concerning mootness sub nom. Upper Pecos
Ass'n v. Peterson, 409 U.S. 1021 (1972). In Upper Pecos Ass'n the county had received
funds from the Economic Development Administration of the Department of Commerce
for the construction of a road in an economically depressed area (pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3121-226 (1970). Plaintiffs unsuccessfully argued that the preparation of an impact
statement by the Forest Service prior to location and design was meaningless since the
grant had already been made. The lack of an intermediate planning action, and the direct,
rather than complex, relationship among funding, planning, and construction, sharply dif-
ferentiate this funding scheme from highway planning funding.
71 See 469 F.2d at 598.
72 Notes 50-66 supra & accompanying text.
73 But cf. note 86 infra.
It must be remembered throughout this discussion that the argument being advanced
is that federal funding makes the plans federal, not that the later building of roads based
on these plans is federal if conducted without financial support. See note 82 infra.
74 Council on Environmental Quality Guidelines f1 5(a) (ii), 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971).
The Council's Guidelines were not promulgated as regulations. They may, however,
carry great weight in judicial interpretation of the language of § 102(2) (C):
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ties") that receive federal funds but for which state and local officials
retain primary responsibility may nevertheless be characterized as
federal75 for purposes of NEPA.
This implication, that original federal funding so permeates the
resulting program as to bring the results of that program within section
102(2) (C), has recently been given assertive force by several courts
in a nonplanning context. Most significant is Named Individual
Members of San Antonio Conservation Society v. Texas Highway
DepartmentY3 In San Antonio a multilane expressway through the
Brackenridge-Olmos Parklands in San Antonio was broken into seg-
ments by the Texas Highway Department in the process of negotiating
for FHWA approval over the objections of environmentalists. Two of
the segments led up to the park on opposite sides, and the third, the
disputed segment, sliced through the park to join them. The Secretary
of Transportation "approved" the two segments outside the park in
return for an agreement by the state to study alternative alignments
between the two. State officials, however, declared their infention to
build the middle segment with or without FHWA approval and the
federal funds contingent on that approval.77 Despite the state's deter-
mination to go it alone on that segment if necessary, the court held
that the entire expressway was a single project for purposes of deter-
mining the applicability of section 102 (2) (C), and, most significantly
for present purposes, that it had been subject to the requirements of
section 102 (2) (C) ever since the "Secretary of Transportation autho-
rized federal participation.178 The state itself, as "a partner" in the
[W]e would not lightly suggest that the Council, entrusted with the responsi-
bility of developing and recommending national policies "to foster and promote
the improvement of environmental quality," has misconstrued NEPA.
Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 421 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
849 (1972) (citation omitted).
75The use of the term "federal" throughout this Comment is not meant to suggest
that the activities are somehow not "state" activities at the same time. "Federal" is used
in a restricted statutory sense to mark the extent to which courts may be willing to find
§ 102(2)(C) applicable to certain federal-state activities.
76446 F.2d 1013 (Sth Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
San Antonio would be circumvented by a provision of the Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1973, S. 502, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 147 (1972), which states:
Notwithstanding any other provisions of Federal law or any court decision to the
contrary, the contractual relationship between the Federal and State governments
shall be ended with respect to all portions of the San Antonio North Expressway
between Interstate Highway 35 and Interstate Loop 410, and the Expressway
shall cease to be a Federal aid project.
The specificity of this provision indicates that it was written in an effort to alter the
result of San Antonio without disturbing the legal basis on which the court reached that
result; the Senate Public Works Committee has explained that such was its intention.
S. Rep. No. 92-1081, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 42-43 (1972). Consistent with this reading,
criticism of the provision has not been that it undermines a judicial precedent but that
it creates a Congressional precedent which will make it difficult for legislators to refuse
subsequent state-requested exceptions of a similar nature. Tnm, Oct. 9, 1972, at 62. The
arguments that follow in the text, insofar as they are dependent on the continued vitality
of San Antonio, assume the correctness of this reading.
77446 F.2d at 1027; see id. at 1017 & n.7.78 d. at 1028. The court goes on to state:
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undertaking, was bound by those requirements.7" Thus San Antonio
stands, at least in part, for the principle that authorization of federal
participation in an enterprise is sufficient to make that enterprise federal
for purposes of section 102 (2) (C).
Subsequent discussion has characterized San Antonio as the federal
judiciary's knee-jerk reaction to a peculiarly overt state attempt to
evade federal law, which if allowed to go unchecked would seriously
erode the law's ability to achieve its intended goals.80 But Thompson v.
Fugate"' indicates that San Antonio applies generally to federal-state
relations under the Federal-Aid Highway Acts and NEPA, without
regard to any intent to frustrate federal policy. Fugate, another high-
way case, considered a project which was a part of Route 288, which
was in turn a portion of the Richmond beltway; it had been planned
to intersect Tuckahoe Plantation. Though the state department of high-
ways had not yet applied for federal funds for the road in question,
the court held that this project, as part of Route 288 and the beltway,
other portions of which had already received substantial commitments
of federal funds, was a federal action for purposes of section 102
(2) (C) and other federal statutes. The court's discussion in Fugate
suggests, indeed, that this characterization was required, insofar as it
could be supported by the facts, to prevent frustration of the congres-
sional policy announced in NEPA. At the same time the opinion con-
tains no indication that an intent to evade the requirements of NEPA
underlay the state's delay in formally requesting federal-aid highway
funds. The principle to be gleaned from San Antonio and Fugate is
this: that after a state program has begun with federal approval and
assistance, action pursuant to that program is federal and must con-
form with the requirements of NEPA. Noting the compelling nature
of the congressional policies embodied in NEPA, the courts in both
cases extended this principle to instances in which the state retained
That authorization triggered the advertisement for contract bids, the letting of
contracts, and the commencement of construction that has erected almost YA of
the southern "segment" of the North Expressway. No one forced the State to
seek federal funding, to accept federal participation, or to commence construc-
tion of a federal aid highway. The State, by entering into this venture, volun-
tarily submitted itself to federal law. It entered with its eyes open, having more
than adequate warning of the controversial nature of the project and of the ap-
plicable law. And while this marriage between the federal and state defendants
seems to have been an unhappy one, it has produced an already huge concrete
offspring whose existence it is impossible for us to ignore.
Id. at 1028.
79 This result was reached despite the fact that no federal funds had yet passed to
the state. Id. at 1028.
8ONote, 50 TEXAs L. REv. 381 (1972). See Civic Improvement Comm. v. Volpe, 4
BNA ENv. REP. CAs. 1160 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd, 459 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1972) (a post-San
Antonio case, in which, before concluding that an improvement was not a federal action
under NEPA, the court felt compelled to note that the road's "widening with city funds
only is not a device or subterfuge to evade environmental considerations," 4 BNA ENv.
REP. CAs. at 1161).
81347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972).
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or had attempted to retain the power to decide whether and in what
form the activity would go to completion.2
If this principle is applied to section 134 planning operations, it
should be clear that they are federal for section 102 (2) (C) purposes
once they have been included as items in an authorized HPR-PR pro-
gram. At that time they have been fully reviewed at least twice by
FHWA, and federal planning funds are committed. The federal nature
of these planning activities is underscored by FHWA annual certifica-
tion procedures, but certification is not essential: comprehensive plan-
ning for which certification is not required (i.e., statewide intermodal
planning or comprehensive planning in urban areas of less than 50,000)
is also federal under this reaso.ning, if it happens to have been identified
as part of at least one HPR-PR program.'
One might also assert that a comprehensive transportation plan
developed under section 134(a) becomes federal in light of a strong
expectation that much of the plan will be implemented with federal
funds at the construction phase. This assertion is subject to important
qualifications, however. A state will not necessarily seek federal funds
8 2 In the foregoing cases, this conclusion was applied to portions of such a program;
splitting off a portion from the main program did not divest it of its acquired "federal-
ness." It has been pointed out that the court's holding in San Antonio was rather nar-
rowly confined to the situation where one "project" was divided into "segments" for
programming purposes. Note, 50 TEXAS L. REv. 381 (1972). Fugate has broken that con-
finement, it seems, for in that case the court held that Route 288 was in its entirety a
federal action requiring an impact statement, although the route had been treated by
the state as separate "projects" for programming purposes. The court in Fugate seemed
on the verge of holding the entire beltway a single federal action, although such a step
was not necessary to achieve its result:
The Richmond beltway, including Route 288 in its entirety, is indeed one which
must be characterized as a major federal action and a proposed federally assisted
undertaking....
The beltway system must be viewed as a whole, and at the very least, Route
288 must be so viewed.
347 F. Supp. at 123-24.
It should be noted at the same time, however, that neither San Antonio nor Fugate
will comfortably support the contention that whole highway systems, portions of which
have been or are being built with federal funds, are federal in every part for every
purpose. This point was made by Civic Improvement Comm. v. Volpe, 4 BNA ENv. REP.
CAS. 1160 (W.D.N.C.), aff'd, 459 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1972). Civic Improvement was a post-
San Antonio decision in which it was held that a locally funded street improvement was
not federal, even though it connected with federally funded routes as part of a
"sixth circumferential" and had been recommended in a 1960 comprehensive highway
plan to whose development the federal government had contributed $91,000. 459 F.2d at
959 (Craven, J., concurring and dissenting). This holding was not questioned by the court
in Fugate, which distinguished the road at issue in Civic Improvement from the Tuckahoe
portion of Route 288 as "an isolated street, local in nature." 347 F. Supp. at 124.
It is unnecessary for this Comment to take a position on the permissible degree of
"splitting." The argument here is that federal approval and funding of the state's plan-
ning process as a whole are sufficient to make that process federal under NEPA.
83 This result is not inconsistent with the one decision which has considered planning
under § 102(2) (C). In deciding not to require an impact statement on Iowa's en-
tire Statewide Freeway-Expressway System, the plan for which had been adopted in
1965, the court in Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972),
relied, at least in part, on the fact that "Eflederal approval has not been requested and
is not needed for such planning. No federal money has been involved." 345 F. Supp. at
1169. See text accompanying notes 104-11 infra. It is clear that these statements cannot
be made with reference to planning done with § 307(C) (2) funds.
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at the construction phase for every project which grows from section
134(a) comprehensive planning activity. If a state does not seek fed-
eral funds, it is not obliged to follow the comprehensive plan84 or to
submit to other federal requirements, such as NEPA's section 102
(2) (C). It would seem to follow from this that no plan becomes federal
simply by virtue of funds anticipated at the project development stage.
Nevertheless, the general expectation of federal funds in implementa-
tion phases surely buttresses the characterization of section 134(a)
comprehensive plans as "federal" and carries in addition the suggestion,
developed below,85 that such plans have substantial and immediate
import for the preservation and enhancement of environmental values. 6
84 Under §§ 109-10 of the proposed Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, S. 502, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), state designation of federal-aid primary and federal-aid urban
highway systems would be required to be consistent with § 134 planning.
85 Notes 97-104 infra & accompanying text.
8 6 An alternative view may be of some help if the "permeation" argument presented
in the text is rejected. Even if the funds and guidance provided by the federal government
are not sufficient to "federalize" the plans that result, the actual HPR-PR work program
authorization might trigger the § 102(2)(C) requirement at that earlier stage. Cf.
notes 67-73 supra & accompanying text. Authorization, the annual commitment of federal
funds to state planning activities, is patently a federal action. The same may be said of
the annual § 134 pre-program certification procedure. See D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v.
Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231, 1240 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972) (holding Dep't
of Transportation could not delegate its certification responsibilities to the local planning
agencies). Under the analysis presented in the text accompanying notes 87-94 infra, this
authorization would be major. See Pa syLvANiA DP'T O TRANSPORTATION, supra note 58,
at 10-11; Letter of Authorization from George F. Fenton, Division Engineer, FHWA, to
Jacob Kassab, Secretary, Pennsylvania Dep't of Transportation, July 10, 1972. Similarly,
if the argument is accepted that planning can significantly affect the quality of the human
environment, see notes 95-109 infra & accompanying text, then the FHWA's authorization
will meet all of the § 102 (2) (C) criteria.
If an annual HPR-PR work program impact statement process were adopted, multi-
year planning projects might be reviewed several times before their completion. The ad-
ministrative burden imposed by this result would not be inconsiderable, although it could
be reduced somewhat by granting less exhaustive treatment to aspects of planning items
already dealt with in a previous year's impact statement. In spite of this burden, one
federal court has required serial § 102(2) (C) statements on a single project funded under
an annual appropriations arrangement. Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 339 F. Supp.
806 (E.D. Tenn. 1972) (TVA's yearly request for Congressional funds for the Tellico
Project comes within the reach of § 102(2)(C) and separate impact statements are re-
quired to accompany each appropriations request).
The efficacy of annual pre-program impact statements would be enhanced under an
amendment to § 134(a) in the proposed Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, S. 502,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). This provision would direct the Secretary of Transportation
to develop regulation for public participation in the § 134(a) process.
which shall include hearings, held at least annually, at which there would be a
review of the transportation planning process, plans and programs, and oppor-
tunity provided for the consideration of alternative modes of transportation.
Id. § 124. Whether public participation would be meaningful at this point might depend
on assessments of systems alternatives available at the time of the hearings. If hearings
were coordinated with existing HPR-PR work program review and certification pro-
cedures, an annual planning program impact statement might be available prior to hear-
ings which could provide the basis for reasonably informed discussion of alternatives by
participants. Nevertheless, it is not clear that incremental assessments of the activities of
planning agencies within a state would fulfill all the purposes of environmental review at
the systems phase. The desideratum remains a review of plans at a stage of completion
that would allow full testing of each component in the context of the entire system.
But cf. text accompanying notes 116-21 infra.
1973] IMPACT STATEMENTS ON HIGHWAY PLANNING 891
2. Major Actions
The second requirement that must be met in order to bring an
activity within section 102 (2) (C) of NEPA is that it be "major.""7
An essentially clear and readily applied test for this quality was pro-
pounded by the court in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Grant,8"
and has subsequently found general approval.89
Grant defined a major action as a "federal action that requires
substantial planning, time, resources, or expenditure."" ° The Chicod
Creek Watershed Project, found to be "major" by the Grant court,
took "several years" of planning and preparation, and cost $1,503,831,
of which $706,684 was budgeted from federal sources.
Under Grant, the preparation of comprehensive plans in major
urban areas clearly represents a "major" governmental effort for pur-
poses of section 102 (2) (C). An areawide network planning study in
an urban context may take five years to complete 1 and require updating
at regular intervals after its completion. A study in a city such as
Philadelphia could easily cost the federal government $3,000,000,92 an
expenditure nearly three times the Soil Conservation Service's commit-
ment to the Chicod Creek project. While planning for smaller urban
areas will undoubtedly cost less, it is clear that in all section 134 plan-
ning significant outlays of federal money are involved, at least on the
order of magnitude of the expenditures in Grant.93 Furthermore, the
8742 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
88 341 F. Supp. 356 (E.D.N.C. 1972).
89 See, e.g., Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990
(1972); THIR ANuAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 231 n.62.
90 341 F. Supp. at 366-67.
91 Pennsylvania Dep't of Transportation, supra note 20.
92 Because the cost of an activity of this scope and duration would be met from
several sources and spread over several fiscal periods, it may not be readily determinable.
Pennsylvania's HPR-PR program for fiscal year 1973 calls for a total expenditure of
$8,143,390, of which $4,790,935 or about 59% is authorized as the federal share. Letter
of Authorization from George F. Fenton, Division Engineer, FHWA, to Jacob Kassab,
Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Transportation, July 10, 1972. The work program
puts the cost of carrying on the continuous transportation planning process in Philadelphia
at $1,029,400, which represents a federal expenditure of over $600,000, if it is assumed
that the ratio of federal to state funds allocated for planning in Philadelphia is the same
as the ratio for the HPR-PR project for the entire state. An equivalent expenditure over
five years yields the $3,000,000 figure in the text. This figure represents only funds from
federal-aid highway sources; input of federal funds from other sources is treated in the
text accompanying notes 63-64 supra.
93 Furthermore, to the extent the exact figures are significant, there is support for
the view that in determining whether an action is "major" for § 102(2) (C) purposes
it is proper to look at the entire amount spent for the action, not just the amount of
federal money spent. For example, in licensing cases "major federal actions" are found
despite the fact that no federal money will be spent on the project, thereby indicating
that the conclusion that an action is "federal" and that it is "major" are totally un-
related. See, e.g., Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 192) (approval of lease of
Indian land); Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 849 (1972) (undisputed); Izaak Walton League of America v. Schle-
singer, 337 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1971) (AEC interim operating license for nuclear power
plant). Thus in determining whether § 134(a) planning is major, both state and federal
money should be considered. Except under limited circumstances, states are required to
match federal planning contributions. See note 51 supra & accompanying text.
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periodic revisions of these comprehensive plans are also sufficiently
major to come within the impact statement requirement. Each individ-
ual revision, whatever the cost, is under the larger umbrella of compre-
hensive planning, which, as a whole, even after the adoption of the
original plan, requires significant amounts of time, effort, and money.
Splitting the planning process into segments which would avoid their
classification as "major actions" is no more justified than separating
highway segments to avoid the "federal" label."
3. Actions Significantly Affecting the Quality of the
Human Environment
The fact that an action is "major" does not necessarily imply that
it significantly affects the quality of the human environment. 5 That
last portion of the section 102 (2) (C) formula was construed by the
Grant court as applying to actions "having an important or meaningful
effect, direct or indirect, upon a broad range of aspects of the human
environment." 96 In considering this definition it must be remembered
that by its nature the effect of a plan can only be indirect, and, of
course, whether it has any impact will depend on its implementation.
It must be expected that not all of the steps recommended by planners
at the systems stage will be taken, and not all of the steps taken pursu-
ant to an adopted plan will be federally funded or otherwise involve
FHWA.97 Once they are adopted, however, comprehensive plans exert
a controlling influence because construction projects for which a state
expects federal funds must be consistent with the section 134 (a) plans.98
Furthermore, spurred by the addition of section 109 (h) to the highway
code,99 FHWA has recently encouraged states to produce plans for
bringing programs into closer accord with comprehensive studies and
objectives. 100 This new initiative supports an expectation that completed
94 See, e.g., Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972);
Named Individual Members of San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dep't,
446 F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933 (1972).
95 Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 644 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 990 (1972).
96 341 F. Supp. at 367.
97 See Civic Improvement Comm. v. Volpe, 4 BNA ENv. REP. CAS. 1160 (W.D.N.C.),
aff'd, 459 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1972).
98 FHWA Instructional Memorandum 50-3-71, ff B2 (Apr. 13, 1971) (implementing
23 U.S.C. § 134 (1970)).
99 23 U.S.C. § 109(h) (1970).100FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-4 ff 14b(2), 37 Fed. Reg. 21430,
21432 (1972) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. ch. I, pt. 1, app. A). The "action plans" re-
quired by PPM 90-4 are discussed at text accompanying notes 122-33 infra. Two factors
which in the Department of Transportation's view have inhibited implementation of
"complementary transportation plans" were spelled out in the 1970 Highway Needs Re-
port:
First, imaginative coordinated programs are often not implemented because the
funds required for the public transportation portions of complementary schemes
have not been available at the time needed .... Second, most planning agencies
do not have the authority to implement plans. A plan, once developed, is turned
over to one or more of the many fragmented units of local government for imple-
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plans will become more fully determinative of the pattern of construc-
tion that follows their adoption, enhancing their significance in terms of
eventual impact on "the quality of the human environment."
In order to conclude that comprehensive system plans require
impact statements it is necessary to overcome the notion that only
practical developments--construction and other physical disturbances
-can significantly affect the quality of the human environment and
trigger section 102 (2) (C). Such an attitude would directly contravene
the clear implication of the Grant test that significant impacts can be
indirect. More basically, this attitude is refuted by the very words of
section 102 (2) (C). That section requires impact statements "on pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment."101 This clearly implies
that legislation is one form of action that can significantly affect the
environment. Thus the phrase cannot be read as including only con-
struction and other physical developments. Clearly a comprehensive
plan with which future construction must be consistent will often have
a far more direct environmental impact than legislation.
Similarly, it is not impossible or unrealistic to have significant and
worthwhile statements at the planning stage. For example, FHWA has
filed an impact statement on a policy and procedure memorandum
which does no more than require states to develop procedures to guaran-
mentation. These governmental units frequently fail to coordinate their efforts to
the degree necessary to effectively implement the plan.
FEDALa HIGWnAY ADmJnSmATION, U.S. DEPARTNm T OF TRANSPORTATION, 1970 NA-
TIONAL HIGHWAY NEEns REPORT 16 (prelim. ed. 1970).
Corrections to overcome these problems are still to be made at the state and local
levels in many areas. At the federal level, some corrective measures appear in the proposed
Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973, S. 502, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). As amended and
approved by the Senate, it would partially remove the "for-highways-only" tag on fed-
eral-aid highway funds. 119 CONG. REC. 54746-82 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1973). The bill also
contains a provision which would encourage the development of the "metropolitan trans-
portation agency." Id. § 125(a) (proposed amendment to 23 U.S.C. § 135 (1970)). A
creature of local governments within a single urban region, the metropolitan transporta-
tion agency would have "sufficient authority to develop and implement a plan for
expenditure of funds . . . ." Id. The bill would encourage the growth of such organs
by making them prospective recipients of federal-aid funds for the urban system. The
coordinated region-wide expenditure of these funds for transportation, if competently
administered, should correct, at least to some degree, the fitfulness with which past
plans have been implemented.
Should they be enacted (as of this writing the amendment had passed the Senate,
119 CONG. REC. 54982 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1973), but failed in the House, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 20, 1973, at 1, col 2) both of these developments would enforce the point made in
the text: that plans may be expected to have greater and greater impact in terms of
the pattern of construction which follows their adoption.
101 The actual language of § 102(2) (C) requires agencies to "include in every recom-
mendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions signifi-
cantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement . . . ." 42
U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). Arguably, § 134(a) plans would fall within this language
as being "recommendation[s] or report[s] on proposals for ...major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment," since the projects they
recommend clearly are within § 102(2)(C). This argument would make much of the
textual analysis unnecessary for the conclusion, but the courts have apparently ignored
the "recommendation or report" language in their construction of the statute.
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tee input by interested parties,1 0 2 a far less specific determination than
a comprehensive plan. This is not to say that further impact statements
will not be needed at a later stage when location or design decisions are
made.0 8 Decisions at more than one level can constitute "actions sig-
nificantly affecting the quality of the human environment."
One recent district court decision raises questions concerning sev-
eral of the propositions developed thus far in this Comment. In Indian
Lookout Alliance v. Volpe0 4 the plaintiffs sought, among other things,
an environmental impact statement on Iowa's entire Freeway-Express-
way System, and on one particular 272-mile freeway within that system.
The plans for the system had been adopted by the state highway
commissioner in 1965.105 The court held that no impact statement was
required. Speaking of the Freeway-Expressway System and the one
freeway involved, the court stated:
These are nothing more than tentative plans for future high-
way construction for at least 20 years. The map introduced
as an exhibit shows only general corridors which are subject
to change. Federal approval has not been requested and is
not needed for such planning. No federal money has been in-
volved. Neither has reached the stage of being a "major
federal action." 10 6
The conclusion that a "major federal action" was not involved ap-
parently resulted from the lack of federal approval or money-a
conclusion which does not present difficulties as to planning that is
federally funded under section 307.10" To the extent, however, that
the court was influenced by the tentative nature of these plans, the
opinion is inconsistent with the present analysis. This concern cannot
be related to the question whether the plans were "federal." Nor is
the concern over tentativeness related to the question of whether the
action involved was major. Rather, to the extent the plan's tentative
nature was given weight by the court, it must have been because of
the court's belief that a plan cannot have a significant effect on the
environment-thus failing under the third section 102 (2) (C) criterion,
unmentioned by the court.0 8 As has been discussed, such a conclu-
102 FEDERAL HIGHWAY ADMnIISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, FINAL EN-
vIoRNMNTAL lipACT STATEMENT ON 109(h) GUnmEwus (1972) (National Technical In-
formation Service No. EIS AA 72 4994 F).
103 See text accompanying notes 22-38 supra.
104345 F. Supp. 1167 (S.D. Iowa 1972).
105d. at 1168-69.
1 0
61d. at 1169.
10 7 See notes 50-60 supra & accompanying text.
0 8 At least one other court has apparently considered the tentative nature of an
action relevant to the "major federal action" requirement, rather than the appropriate
"significantly affecting the quality of the human environment" language. See Upper Pecos
Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded for a determina-
tion concerning mootness sub nom. Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Peterson, 409 U.S. 1021 (1972).
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sion is unjustified in view of the influence section 134 plans exert
over later projects. 0 9
4. Possibility and Practicality
The Indian Lookout court impliedly raised another problem: the
requirements of section 102 of NEPA, including impact statements,
apply only "to the fullest extent possible. ' 110 Speaking of the plan,
the court said "[i] t would be impossible to prepare an [environmental
impact statement] on such indefinite proposals and it would be highly
impractical to require it.""' In making this statement the court made
no reference to the "fullest extent possible" language of the act but
that is the only conceivable basis for its concern with possibility and
practicality. Admittedly, by virtue of their very scope and their re-
moteness in time from project construction, comprehensive plans must
be general and tentative. It is precisely these qualities which make
the comprehensive planning phase most appropriate for evaluating
broad impacts and alternatives before commitments to individual proj-
ects have been made, and while elements of the system can still be
readily adjusted to compensate for changes on the system level. These
qualities do not make impact statements on section 134(a) plans
impossible or even impractical. As to the latter, it has been well es-
tablished by the courts that inconvenience does not excuse the impact
statement requirement."' And any claim of impossibility must be
viewed in light of the legislative history which indicates that the
phrase "to the fullest extent possible" was meant to expand rather
than limit the obligations of federal agencies, requiring compliance
with section 102(2) "unless the existing law applicable to such agen-
cy's operations expressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one
of the directives impossible ....,"" No statute limits the FHWA's
obligations in this regard. Furthermore, both the FHWA" 4 and the
109 The court's objections to requiring an environmental impact statement on the
plan for the entire system do not appear to have included the plan's having been adopted
prior to the effective date of NEPA, Jan. 1, 1970. This omission suggests that the court
failed to consider the plan an action separate from its possible later implementation.
11042 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
111345 F. Supp. at 1169-70.
112See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States AEC, 449
F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("Thus the Section 102 duties are not inherently flexi-
ble .... Considerations of administrative difficulty, delay or economic cost will not
suffice to strip the section of its fundamental importance.").
113 Conference Report No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969) ; see Council on En-
vironmental Quality Guidelines f1 4, 36 Fed. Reg. 7724 (1971) (adopting this interpreta-
tion); City of New York v. United States, 337 F. Supp. 150, 158 n.9 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
The Conference Report expressed the intention that "no agency shall utilize an excessively
narrow construction of its existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance.' Con-
ference Report No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 10 (1969).
114 The FHWA has recently agreed to prepare a "regional impact consideration" for
the 3-A system in Baltimore. Among the issues scheduled for discussion in the considera-
tion are the "[c]umulative (Regional) air pollution impact of the various stages of com-
pletion of the currently envisioned 3-A system" and "[a] detailed discussion of possible
modification to the proposed system to mitigate air pollution problems.' Memorandum
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Environmental Protection Agency" 5 have indirectly indicated that pro-
gram impact statements are in fact feasible.
5. Planning or a Plan
Under one set of circumstances even the completion of a com-
prehensive plan could be too late for an effective systems impact
statement. In D.C. Federation of Civil Associations v. Volpe"" the
district court held that under the language of section 134(a) a high-
way project in an urban area need not be part of a completed trans-
portation plan for the area. It need only grow from an acceptable
planning process.17 Although the court did not rely on it, there is
support for this position in the legislative history."8
Thus, unless a periodic review of in-process planning is re-
quired, 119 important projects might be able to avoid section 134(a)
systems impact statements by reaching advanced stages before a full-
plan review became possible. This danger is limited by two facts.
First, the court of appeals in D.C. Federation, though reversing on
other grounds, substantially undercut the district court's holding on
this point by stating that the Department of Transportation must
take "into account the recommendations of local plans . ... 11o Sec-
ond, since the time of the D.C. Federation decision the FHWA has
stated that it will not grant program approval to any project in an
urbanized area unless the project "serves to implement an areawide
from J. Collins, Transportation Coordinator, Environmental Impact Branch, Region III,
Environmental Protection Agency, to J. Canny, Dep't of Transportation, Sept. 15, 1972.
Impacts and alternatives relating to land use and urban societal patterns could also be
successfully addressed in a program § 102 statement. See note 24 supra. It should, however,
be noted that the quoted agreement was in the nature of a compromise, and the required
"regional impact consideration" is not a full impact statement in either its scope or its
review process. See Letter from John C. Armor to the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, Dec. 20, 1972, on file in Biddle Law Library, Univ. of Pa. Law School.
115 See Letter from Paul De Falco, Jr., Regional Administrator, Region IX, Environ-
mental Protection Agency, to Regional Administrator, Region IX, Federal Highway Ad-
ministration (undated), reprinted in Brief for Appellant at A-1, Indian Lookout Alliance
v. Volpe, No. 72-1620 (8th Cir., filed Dec. 8, 1972); Letter from Bart Hague, Chief, En-
vironmental Impact Branch, Region I, Environmental Protection Agency, to Angelo J.
Siccardi, Division Engineer, Federal Highway Administration (May 1, 1972), reprinted in
Brief for Appellant at A-7, Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, No. 72-1620 (8th Cir.,
filed Dec. 8, 1972).
116 316 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C.
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972).
117 316 F. Supp. at 795.
118 The Committee recognizes that transportation planning is almost invariably
a continuing process; hence, this section has been drawn in such a way as to
make it clear that a completed comprehensive plan, as such, is not necessary to
meet its requirements.
S. Rat'. No. 1997, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1962).
119 See note 86 supra.
120 459 F.2d 1231, 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The court also stated that, "Enlo compre-
hensive transportation plan had been adopted at that time," and referred to the local
planning commission approval as "stale, inapposite, and unsupported by any underlying,
comprehensive plan ... ." Id. at 1241.
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plan developed within the planning process and held currently valid
by the policy board."'-
B. Other Statutory Provisions
NEPA contains, in addition to the "action-forcing" section 102
(2) (C), language directing federal agencies "to the fullest extent pos-
sible" generally to make creative use of "the policies, regulations,
and public laws of the United States" in an effort to achieve the
Act's broad goal of environmentally sound planning on a national
scale.122 Congress has redirected this mandate to FHWA in quite
specific terms. The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1970 required the
Secretary of Transportation to
promulgate guidelines designed to assure that possible adverse
economic, social, and environmental effects relating to any
proposed project on any Federal-aid system have been fully
considered in developing such project .... 123
The Secretary's response, Policy and Procedure Memorandum
90-4 (PPM 90-4), was adopted on October 1, 1972. 12 It requires
each state intending to participate in federal-aid funds to submit, by
June 15, 1973, an action plan for integrating the considerations spelled
out in section 109(h) into the state agency's structure and proce-
dures.12
An action plan should explain
[p]rocedures to be followed to: (a) Insure that potential
social, economic, and environmental effects are identified in-
sofar as practicable in system planning studies as well as in
later stages of location and design.'
26
PPM 90-4 further requires "procedures to be followed to insure that
. . . [a] range of alternatives appropriate to the stage is considered
at each stage from systems studies through final design."'.2 7 If the
procedures developed under these provisions are adequate, the result-
ing assessment should not be very different from what would be con-
tained in a section 102 (2) (C) statement. There should even be a
close approximation of the section 102 (2) (C) requirement that a draft
121 FHWA Instructional Memorandum 50-3-71, f1 B2 (Apr. 13, 1971).
12242 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (1970).
12323 U.S.C. § 109(h) (1970).
124 37 Fed. Reg. 21430 (1972) (to be codified at 23 C.F.R. ch. I, pt. 1, App. A).
125 "The FHWA will not give location approval on projects after November 1, 1973,
unless the Action Plan has been approved." FHWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum
90-4, ff 6f, 37 Fed. Reg. 21430, 21431 (1972). "The FHWA may withhold location ap-
provals, or such other project approvals as it deems appropriate, if the Action Plan is
not being followed." Id. ff 7a, 37 Fed. Reg. 21431.
120 Id. f1 14b, 37 Fed. Reg. 21432.
1 2 71d. f 10b(2), 37 Fed. Reg. 21432.
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impact statement be circulated for the comments of "any Federal
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect
to any environmental impact involved"' 128 and that it be made avail-
able to the public."2 9 PPM 90-4 provides that "[i]nformation about
the existence, status, and results of studies should be made available
to the public throughout those studies."'13 0 It also declares as a matter
of policy that "[o]ther agencies" as well as the public should be
"involved in project development early enough to influence . . . final
decisions."'' It requires specifically that states develop procedures
[t]o insure that interested parties, including local govern-
ments and metropolitan, regional, State and Federal agencies,
and the public have an opportunity to participate in an open
exchange of views throughout the stages of project develop-
ment.13
Although a crabbed reading of "project" could confine the reach of
this provision to location and design phases, it should be clear from
the statement of FHWA in first proposing PPM 90-4 that it is in-
tended to include interagency review procedures at the regional plan-
ning stage as well. The FHWA stated: "Other governmental agencies
and the public must be fully informed of highway planning and their
views solicited and considered at all phases of the highway planning
procedure." 33
Thus the provisions of PPM 90-4 could serve as the basis for a
de facto impact statement procedure at the system stage, under which
analyses of system impact and alternatives would be available for
comment to all interested parties: agencies with special expertise as
well as members of the lay public. Whether such an arrangement ac-
tually develops, of course, will depend on the exact content of the
action plans submitted by states under PPM 90-4.
IV. CONCLUSION
The highway decisionmaking process is too long, and its varied
components too complex, to permit thorough environmental analyses
12842 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
129 Id.
1aOFIFWA Policy and Procedure Memorandum 90-4, 1? Ila, 37 Fed. Reg. 21432
(1972).
1311d. ff 4b(2), 37 Fed. Reg. 21431.
1821d. Ii hlb(2), 37 Fed. Reg. 21432.
13837 Fed. Reg. 8398 (1972) (emphasis added).
The FHWA also stated that
[tihe action plan adopted by each State will require the early identification of
economic, social and environmental effects to permit complete analysis and con-
sideration while alternatives are being formulated and evaluated. The plan will
also require the involvement of other governmental agencies and the public early
enough to influence both technical studies and final decisions of the plan, and
will require full consideration of reasonable alternatives.
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at any single point in time. "Compliance to the 'fullest' possible ex-
tent would seem to demand that environmental issues be considered
at every important stage in the decision making process .... .134
Arguments can be made that would require environmental impact
statements to be written at many procedural junctures. To require
statements at all such points would be both duplicative and unrealistic.
The very profusion of potential triggering events may give DOT
and FHWA a certain flexibility in choosing the points at which sec-
tion 102 (2) (C) should apply. But at some point fundamental questions
concerning the environmental effects of regional transportation devel-
opment must be asked. Meaningful consideration must be given to
alternative transportation modes and the interrelationships of individ-
ual projects.
This Comment has discussed possible times for such considera-
tion, and, based on considerations of policy and law, has urged that
one-the completion of a comprehensive plan-be selected. But to a
great extent the actual choice must lie with the agencies involved. 5
Hopefully, the choices made will be consistent not only with their
own goals and internal capabilities, but also with the purposes of
NEPA and the tenets of enlightened planning policy. In any event,
the agencies must not be allowed to escape the burden of considering
at some point the overall impact of transportation development.
134 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. United States AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Although judge Wright was referring to the various stages of
review concerning one decision, the language is equally applicable to decisionmaking
over time. See Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 1971) (Mur-
rah, J., dissenting), cert. granted sub nom. Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Peterson, 406 U.S. 944,
vacated and remanded for a determination concerning mootness sub nom. Upper Pecos
Ass'n v. Peterson, 409 U.S. 1021 (1972).
13 Explorations which should lead to such agency choices in the transportation sys-
tems planning field are now under way. Letter from Russell Train, Chairman, Council
on Environmental Quality, to John Volpe, Secretary of Transportation, Aug. 18, 1972.
